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Introduction  
Tourism demand has grown overtime. In 2010 international tourist arrivals 
reached 940 million, and tourism receipts generated US$ 919 billion; in the 1975–
2000 period, international arrivals have increased at an average pace of 4.6 per 
cent per year (UNWTO, 2011). With approximately 43 million international 
tourists, Italy is the fifth most visited country worldwide and within Europe, it 
ranks third (UNWTO, 2011). 
Academic literature confirms the impact of the tourism sector on the economy; 
a wide strand of research finds a positive linkage between tourism and growth for 
developed and developing countries, in the short and in the long run1.  
Why does the tourism sector have a strong impact at national and regional 
level? It has to do with the characteristics of the product demanded: a bundle of 
goods and services, most of which are non-traded and include both man-made and 
natural amenities (Sinclair and Stabler, 1997).  
On the one side, the increasing demand for the tourism good and the intrinsic 
characteristics of the tourism product boost local economy and make residents 
better off. On the other side, the same features might generate negative 
environmental or social externalities that make residents worse off. When these 
negative impacts are not properly taken into account, tourism-led development 
becomes unsustainable. This paper investigates a possible source of 
unsustainability, which can occur when criminal activity is stimulated by the 
presence of tourists. In this case tourism not only imposes a social cost on 
residents, but also generates a detrimental effect on the tourism market as a whole, 
negatively affecting potential tourism demand. 
Why should crime increase with the presence of tourists? Following Fuji and 
Mak (1980), many reasons can be found: tourists tend to carry valuable objects 
and money; the attitude of holidaymakers tends to be less prudent; tourists are 
perceived as “safer” targets by criminals because they rarely report crime to the 
police; the presence of tourists alters the local environment, for instance, by 
generating a reduction of social responsibility for surveillance. Ryan (1993) and 
Kelly (1993) add that in some cases crime is driven by (tourism) demand for 
illegal goods or services in destinations.  
_________________________ 
1 For an extensive literature review on tourism led-growth hypothesis see Bimonte et al. (2012).  
 www.economics-ejournal.org  2 
According to the Routine Activity Theory of Cohen and Felson (1979), crime 
depends on the opportunities; as a consequence, the presence of tourists increases 
the set of available occurrences. 
Overall, there are not many studies that explore this topic with the aid of 
econometric models. The assumption is usually that criminals are rational à la 
Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) and respond to incentives; as such, the presence 
of tourists is seen as a further incentive for illegal activities. The seminal work of 
Jud (1975) investigates the impact of foreign tourist business on total crime per 
capita in a cross-section of 32 Mexican States for the year 1970 (controlling for 
urbanization). The study confirms that total crime and property-related crime 
(fraud, larceny, and robbery) are strongly and positively linked to tourism, while 
crime against persons (assault, murder, rape, abduction, and kidnapping) is only 
marginally linked to it. Along the same line as Jud (1975), McPheters and Stronge 
(1974) use time series analysis to investigate whether seasonal crime reacts to 
seasonal tourism in Miami. They find that the tourism-crime relationship is 
significant and that economics – related crime such as robbery, larceny and 
burglary follow a similar seasonality to tourism. Fuji and Mak (1980) reach the 
same conclusions for the case of Miami. For a cross section of 50 US States, 
Pizam (1982) finds a weak relationship between tourism and crime, suggesting 
that perhaps the relationship is not supported at the national level. Van Tran and 
Bridges (2009), controlling for the degree of urbanization, the rate of 
unemployment, and the spatial position of the each state within Europe, analyse 
the relationship between tourist arrivals and crime against persons in 46 European 
countries. They find that, on average, an increase in the number of tourists reduces 
the rate of crime against persons.  
More recently, using panel data on crime and visitors of National Parks in 
every county in the US, Grinols et al. (2011) conclude that for some tourist type 
there is no impact on crime. Campaniello (2011), again using a panel approach, 
explores the case of the 1990 Football World Cup in Italy; the results indicate that 
hosting the Football World Cup has led to a significant increase in property 
crimes. Along the same line, Biagi and Detotto (2012) find a positive relationship 
between tourism and pick-pocketing for a cross section of Italian provinces.  
The main aim of the present paper is to test whether the positive tourism-crime 
relationship found in Biagi and Detotto (2012) for a cross-section of Italian 
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provinces2, is persistent over time. Applying a System GMM approach to a panel 
of Italian provinces for the time span 1985–2003, we empirically test whether total 
crime in Italy is affected by tourist arrivals. In other words, the purpose of the 
paper is to demonstrate that, all else being equal, in the long run tourist areas tend 
to have a greater amount of crime that non-tourist ones – for the case study of 
Italy.  
A connection between tourism and crime does not tell us whether the victims 
are tourists or residents; it merely indicates the presence of a link between tourism 
and crime as a potential source of negative externalities. Knowing which group of 
people is more affected may give essential information to better quantify the 
externality and to identify possible solutions. For instance, criminal activity that 
mainly targets tourists would impact on the image of a tourist destination as a 
whole, decreasing its future tourism demand; if on the contrary, the crime is 
largely committed against residents, the externality affects the quality of life of 
locals. Unfortunately, due to the scarce availability of crime data worldwide, this 
analysis is not often undertaken; the few papers available use descriptive statistics 
(for the case of Hawaii see Chesnay-Lind and Lind, 1986; for the case of Barbados 
see de Albuquerque and McElroy, 1999). Since data on the victimization rate of 
visitors and residents are not provided by the National Institute of Statistics (from 
now on ISTAT) we can just re-estimate the model using the level of total crime 
instead of the rate, and controlling for population, size of the province and 
equivalent tourists (i.e. the number of tourist per day in destinations). Although the 
effect of tourism on crime is confirmed, results cannot be interpreted 
unequivocally and depend on the (unknown) propensity to report and to be 
victimized of the two sub-groups.  
We find that the effect of the presence of residents on crime is higher than the 
effect of the presence of tourists, and that the difference between the two 
coefficients is significantly different from zero. These results should be further 
investigated by using the propensities to be victimized and to report of the two 
populations, which are not available at the moment.  
_________________________ 
2 The analysis focuses on the tourism-related crime in the Italian provinces for the time span 1985-
2003. The number of provinces has changed overtime; from 1974 until 1992 the national territory 
was divided into 95 provinces, which become 103 in 1992 and 107 in 2006. To have a balanced 
panel, the study considers the classification at 95. 
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 offers a descriptive analysis of the 
evolution of tourism and crime in Italy. Section 2 focuses on the data and 
empirical model; Section 3 describes the results. Section 4 highlights the main 
concluding remarks. 
1 Tourism and Crime in Italy 
Tourism and crime are two relevant phenomena in Italy. As reported by the 
National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) the number of tourists in Italy has 
constantly increased: 57 million arrivals (international and domestic tourists) were 
counted in the official tourist accommodations in 19853, while they reached 83 
million in 2003 (a growth rate of 47%); the number of nights in official 
accommodations was about 333 million in 1985, and reached 344 million in 2003 
(+3%)4. During this time span tourist arrivals have increased on average by 2.2% 
and tourist nights by 0.5%. As a result, the average length of stay decreased from 
about 6 days to 4. This downward trend of tourist nights is in line with the EU 
trend where the number of nights has decreased more than the number of trips (–
1.6 % and –1.0 % respectively; Eurostat, 2011). 
In 2003, more than fifty per cent of tourist arrivals and nights are accounted for by 
the Northern part of the country. As far as crime is concerned, Italy experienced a 
rather exceptional increase over the last 25 years (+35.7%); this trend is in contrast 
with what occurs during the same time span in many other Western countries such 
as the US (–20.4%), Canada (–15.8%), the UK (–10.9%), France (–7.5%) and 
Germany (–6.9%; Eurostat, 2009).  
The comparison of tourist arrivals and total crime series for the time span 
1985–2003 highlights a common upward trend of the two variables (Figure 1), 
even if crime increases at a higher pace than tourism. Furthermore, a counter 
cyclical relationship can be observed between the two series indicating a possible 
negative correlation among them. 
_________________________ 
3 Official accommodations include: hotels, campsites, guesthouses, Bed & Breakfasts, and other 
types of accommodation. 
4 Tourist arrivals are the number of visitors – domestic and foreign – registered in official 
accommodation; tourist nights are the total number of nights spent by visitors in official 
accommodation (ISTAT).  
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Figure 1. Tourism and crime series (base year=1985) 
 
Notes: we use index numbers with a fixed base value 1985=100 
Source: our elaboration on data from ISTAT 
In order to better understand the underlying tourism-crime relationship, we 
follow three main steps. Firstly, the location quotient (LQ) of tourism (LQTourism) 
and crime (LQCrime) are calculated for each Italian province. LQs allow computing 




i= 1, 2,…95 provinces 
Total_Arrivalsi = tourist arrivals in each province in 2003 
Total_Arrivals = tourist arrivals in Italy in 2003 
Areai = Surface in km2 of each province  
Total_Area = Italian surface in km2 
Total_Crimei = total crime in each province in 2003 
Total Arrivals
Total Crime
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Total_Crime = total crime in Italy in 2003 
Populationi = inhabitants in each province in 2003 
Total_Population = Italian population in 2003 
Secondly, the results of each LQ are divided in quartiles. Finally, the obtained 
quartiles are matched in order to check how the levels of tourism and crime are 
combined. Table 1 shows the cross tabulation of the quartile distribution of the two 
LQs. The first quadrant in the table displays the number of provinces with low 
level of crime and tourism (14 in total). The principal diagonal contains 47% of 
the Italian provinces, indicating a positive correlation between tourism and crime. 
The chi-squared test ( =45.5) indicates that the k groups are dependent. 
As a result, crime and tourism seem to move in the same direction: low levels 
of tourism correspond to low levels of crime and vice versa. This descriptive 
analysis gives a first hint at the relationship between the two phenomena; this 
relationship needs to be further explored by using appropriate econometric 
techniques. 
Table 1. Number of Provinces for quartiles 
 
 
2 Data and Empirical Model 
Following the empirical literature on crime, this study proposes the use of the 
dynamic panel data approach illustrated below to explore the relationship between 












1st Quartile 14 6 3 1 24 
2nd Quartile 7 7 8 2 24 
3rd Quartile 3 7 9 5 24 
4th Quartile 0 4 4 15 23 
Total 24 24 24 23 95 
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 (3) 
is the number of total crimes per 100,000 inhabitants in the i-th province 
at time t. GROWTH and INCOME indicate the growth rate and level, respectively, 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at 1995 constant prices; UNEMPL is 
the unemployment rate. Cantor and Land (1985) theorize the macroeconomic 
relationship between the economic performance and criminal activity, indicating 
two opposite sources of incentive to criminal behaviour: opportunity and 
motivation effect. The former is linked to fluctuations in INCOME and GROWTH: 
the opportunities to commit crime increase with economic performance, which 
leads to widespread availability of goods and profitable illegal activities. The latter 
works in the opposite way: the incentive to commit crime is caused by bad 
economic conditions. In other words, during recessions, the unemployment rate 
raises inducing individuals to increase their disposable income via illegal 
activities. 
DENSITY refers to the population per square kilometre; it is used as an 
indicator of urbanisation. According to Masih and Masih (1996), crime rises with 
urbanisation. TOURISM measures tourist arrivals (nationals and foreigners) per 
square kilometre; tourist arrivals, weighted by province size, gauge the 
attractiveness of a given destination. According to the empirical literature on the 
crime-tourism relationship, a positive correlation is expected5. DIPLOMA 
indicates the average level of education in the i-th province at time t; a higher level 
of education might indicate a higher level of social cohesion, which could reduce 
crime offences. 
DETERRENCE is the ratio of recorded offences committed by known 
offenders over the total crime recorded; it is a proxy of the deterrence effect 
“stemming from the efficiency of criminal investigation of the local police and 
from their knowledge of the local environment” (Marselli and Vannini, 1997; 
p.96). The expected sign is negative, therefore, a rise in the share of known 
offenders, due to an increase in deterrence or a higher level of efficiency/efficacy 
of police activity, reduces the crime rate.  
_________________________ 
5 See Biagi and Detotto (2012) for an extensive literature review on this topic. 
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All variables are expressed in log-level terms, so that the coefficients can be 
interpreted as elasticities. 
SOUTH is a control variable which equals 1 if the province is located in the 
South of Italy and zero otherwise. YEAR is a set of time dummy variables; the 
inclusion of time dummies makes the assumption of no correlation across 
individuals in the idiosyncratic disturbances more likely to hold (Roodman, 2006).  
Finally, ηi and εit are the province fixed effect and the error term, respectively; we 
assume that ,  and .  
Tables 2 and 3 provide detailed information and some descriptive statistics of 
the variables in use, respectively. 
Table 2. List of explanatory variables 
Name Definition Type of 
variable 
Source 
Crime Total crime offences per 100,000 
inhabitants 
Crime ISTAT, Statistiche 
Giudiziarie Penali 
Growth Growth rate of real value added per 
capita 
Economic Istituto Tagliacarne 
Income Value added per capita at a base prices 
(Year = 1995) 
Economic Istituto Tagliacarne 
Unemployment People looking for a job/labour force * 
100 
Economic Istituto Tagliacarne 
Density Density of population per square 
Kilometre 
Demographic ISTAT, Atlante statistico 
dei comuni 
Tourism Tourists official arrivals per square 
kilometre  
(tourists choosing official 
accommodations) 
Tourism ISTAT, Statistiche del 
turismo 
Diploma People with Italian diploma per 10,000 
inhabitants 
Human capital ISTAT, Atlante statistico 
dei comuni 
Deterrence Ratio of incidents with unknown 
offenders over the total recorded per 
total crime 
Deterrence ISTAT, Statistiche 
Giudiziarie Penali 
South Dummy variable that values one if a 
province is located in the South and 
zero otherwise 
Geographic Our elaboration 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of variables 
Name Mean SD Min Max 
Crime 3,091.80       1,374.01        745.48      13,255.08 
Growth 0.01 0.07 –0.81 0.77 
Income 14,113.17 3,925.78 4,517.04 26,025.37 
Unemployment 10.94   6.71     1.7     33.2 
Density 248.58   345.04   34.47   2,647.02 
Tourism 283.65   392.85  14.76 2,529.23 
Diploma 0.06 0.03 0.002 0.17 
Deterrence 0.32 0.12 0.09 0.83 
South 0.36 0.48 0 1 
 
As analysed by Buonanno (2006), crime series show strong persistence over 
time, indicating that the level of crime activity at time t affects crime behaviour at 
time t+1. To confirm this, we start our analysis running a basic Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) model, both random and fixed effect, and we apply the Wooldridge 
test (Wooldridge, 2002) to check for serial correlation in panel data; we find that 
the null hypothesis of no serial correlation is strongly rejected6. This suggests the 
use of the lagged dependent variable ( ) to remove serial correlation in the 
residuals. A panel unit root test (Levin, Lin and Chu, 2002) is also performed to 
see whether stationarity of the dependent variable in (1), and the null hypothesis of 
non-stationarity are rejected2. 
As pointed out in the previous section, a reverse causality between crime and 
tourism is strongly expected. For example, high crime rates in a given region could 
reduce tourism inflow; as a result, a drop in the economic performance can be 
observed. Unfortunately, criminal activity could directly impact the other 
explanatory variables. As shown in economic literature, crime is detrimental for 
the legal economy, discouraging investments, affecting the competitiveness of 
firms, reallocating resources and creating uncertainty and inefficiency (Detotto and 
Otranto, 2010). Through the economic channel, in a given province, crime could 
affect the density of population, increasing the incentive to move away from crime 
hot spots (Mills and Lubuele, 1997; Cullen and Levitt, 1999), and could also 
_________________________ 
6 The statistic tests are available on request. 
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impact the human capital, reducing the expected human capital returns (Mocan et 
al., 2005). Finally, the reverse causality between crime rate and its deterrence 
variables has been already investigated in the economic empirical literature (see 
Dills et al., 2008).  
The presence of the lagged dependent variable and the lack of strict exogeneity 
between the crime variable and the explanatory variables, do not allow to use the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) method to estimate model (3) (Roodman, 2006). A 
possible solution is given by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), which 
yields a consistent estimator of β using the lagged value of the dependent and 
explanatory variables as instruments. In this analysis, the System GMM estimator 
is used, which performs better than the linear first-differenced GMM in small 
samples (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Roodman, 2006).  
In general, the GMM estimator assumes that residuals are serially 
uncorrelated, i.e.  for i = 1, …, N and s ≠ t, and the initial conditions 
of  and all explanatory variables at time t0 are predetermined. In addition, 
the System GMM estimator requires a mean stationary restriction on the initial 
condition of the variables in use, which implies that, in the period analysed, the 
units are close enough to steady-state: in other words, the changes in the 
instrumenting variables are assumed to be uncorrelated with the individual-specific 
effect. 
It is well known in crime literature that the official crime data, coming from 
police reporting activity, suffer from underreporting and underrecording bias 
(Mauro and Carmeci, 2007). In other words, official data (CRIMEi,t) represent only 
the tip of the crime iceberg. The relationship between these two components can 
be represented as follows: 
 (4) 
where  is the “real” unobserved crime rate, δi is a fixed individual effect 
and υ is a vector of serially uncorrelated residuals. We assume that υit is 
uncorrelated with εis for s≠t. It is worth noticing that the expected value of the 
official data yields a downward biased estimate of the observed crime rate, and 
such bias depends on the α coefficient in (4). In fact, the underreporting problem 
becomes negligible when α is close to one and to zero. As shown in Fajnzylber et 
al. (2002), the measurement error does not modify the assumptions and the 
properties of the GMM approach, which can still provide consistent parameter 
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estimates in panel data models with lagged variables and unobserved time-
invariant individual-specific effects. In addition, the System GMM approach 
reduces the problems of measurement errors (Griliches and Hausman, 1986), 
which makes it preferable to alternative methods.   
Notably, substituting equation (4) in Model (3), we obtain: 
 (5) 
where ,  and .  
Since, by construction,  is between zero and one, the sign of all  
coefficients is still correct but their absolute values are lower than the “real” ones. 
Hence, this should be taken into account when deriving policy implications using 
the latter estimates; basically, we can easily infer that the estimated elasticities are 
lower than the “real” ones, and such discrepancy becomes seriously large as  
approaches zero.  
A crucial assumption for the validity of GMM estimates is that the instruments 
are exogenous. The Sargan (1958) test of overidentifying restrictions tests the 
overall validity of the instruments: failure to reject the null hypothesis gives 
support to the model. But if the errors are (suspected to be) non-spherical, the 
Sargan test is inconsistent; in our case, since the robust standard errors are 
estimated, in order to correct for heteroskedasticity or cross-correlation in the 
residuals, the Hansen (1982) test is performed under the null hypothesis of the 
joint validity of the instruments. An other important issue is the Arellano-Bond 
(1991) test for autocorrelation of the residuals, which checks whether the 
differenced error term is first and second order correlated. Failure to reject the null 
hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation indicates that the residuals are not 
serially correlated. 
3 The Impact of Tourism on Crime: Results 
This section is divided into three main parts. The first one presents the results 
obtained when a set of OLS panels is performed (Section 3.1). The second one 
illustrates the outcomes of GMM models (Section 3.2). Finally, the third part 
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shows the findings obtained discriminating tourism and residents for victimization 
rates (Section 3.3). 
3.1 Basic Results 
In a first stage, equation (5) is run excluding the lagged dependent variable 
(CRIMEi,t–1). Initially, random and fixed effects models (from now on FE and RE 
respectively) are performed, and results are showed in Columns 1-2-3 of Table 4. 
The first column represents the coefficients obtained employing FE, while 
columns two and three illustrate the coefficients of RE models. Since FE drops the 
time invariant dummy SOUTH, two different REs are regressed (Column 2 and 3).  
As one can see, except for the variables TOURISM and DENSITY, the 
coefficients remain stable. The Hausman test indicates FE as the preferred model. 
In this model, TOURISM has a negative impact on crime and is significant at 10% 
level; such puzzling outcomes might be due to bi-directional causality between 
crime and tourism. Therefore, an important issue to check at this point is the 
exogeneity between tourism and crime rate. If tourism is not exogenous, we expect 
that a shock in crime rate would impact tourist arrivals. The goal is to identify an 
instrument variable correlated with TOURISM but not with CRIME. To do so, the 
provinces are divided according to their characteristics: arts city, mountain and 
coastal provinces and all other types of destinations. The first group contains the 
provinces with arts city7; the second includes provinces with more than fifty 
percent of mountain in their territory; the third considers the provinces on the 
coast; and the fourth consists of provinces not included in any of the previous 
categories. We use the yearly average of arrivals per group to instrument the 
tourism variable. The motivation is that a crime shock in an art city probably 
affects that city’s tourism flows but it does not impact the average level of tourism 
in arts city as a whole. In this sense, the variation of arrivals in a given province 
has a negligible effect on the average arrivals in the related group. 
The results of the two stages least square are showed in Columns 4–5 and 6 of 
Table 4. Overall coefficients are stable. Again, the Hausman test suggests FE 
effects (Column 4) as the preferred model. After correcting for endogeneity, the 
sign of the tourism variable turns out to be positive, although not significant.  
_________________________ 
7 For details of art cities in Italy see http://www.discoveritalia.it/cgwe/index.asp?lingua=en. 
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Table 4. OLS results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 FE RE RE FE-IV RE-IV RE-IV 
VARIABLES       
       
Growth –0.11 –0.050 –0.087 –0.098 0.020 –0.059 
 (0.071) (0.072) (0.072) (0.075) (0.077) (0.074) 
Income 0.23*** 0.16*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.0076 0.17*** 
 (0.056) (0.050) (0.054) (0.069) (0.064) (0.057) 
Unemployment –0.11*** –0.047** –0.072*** -0.11*** -0.042** -0.084*** 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) 
Density –0.57*** 0.16*** 0.15*** –0.56*** –0.033 0.0049 
 (0.19) (0.031) (0.031) (0.19) (0.058) (0.050) 
Tourism –0.050* 0.041** 0.062*** 0.028 0.27*** 0.24*** 
 (0.028) (0.019) (0.019) (0.20) (0.059) (0.050) 
Diploma –0.028 –0.028 –0.027 –0.030 -0.041** –0.036* 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
Deterrence –0.26*** –0.28*** –0.28*** –0.26*** -0.28*** –0.28*** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
South   0.21***   0.35*** 
   (0.054)   (0.068) 
Constant 8.89*** 5.20*** 4.00*** 8.55*** 6.32*** 4.67*** 
 (1.18) (0.51) (0.54) (1.42) (0.61) (0.57) 
       
Observations 1,710 1,710 1,710 1,710 1,710 1,710 
R-squared 0.529 0.518 0.519 0.527 0.483 0.496 
Number of provinces 95 95 95 95 95 95 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
At this stage, we perform the Wooldridge test in order to check for possible 
serial correlation in the residuals (Wooldridge, 2002); this statistic test strongly 
suggests the use of the lagged dependent variable (CRIMEi,t–1). The presence of 
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the lagged response variable requires a GMM approach that allows having 
consistent estimates. 
3.2 System GMM Approach: Results  
In a second stage, the coefficients of Equation (5) are estimated using System 
GMM. Results are shown in Table 5 (Columns 1, 2 and 3). The Hansen (1982) test 
for the joint validity of the instruments gives support to the model. In addition, the 
Arellano Bond (1991) indicates that residuals are not serially correlated. As the 
diagnostic tests support the final specification, we can present the findings in 
further details. Since the variable SOUTH is never significant and the estimates in 
Columns 1, 2 and 3 are almost similar, we focus on the first column. 
The coefficient of the lagged response variable (CRIMEi,t–1) is highly 
significant and equal to 0.83, indicating strong persistence in crime series. 
INCOME and UNEMPLOYMENT are significant and positively correlated to 
CRIME, hence a one per cent increase in these variables raises the crime rates by 
0.089% and 0.041%, respectively. 
The variable DETERRENCE is significant and has the expected sign: an 
increase of the effectiveness of Police activities reduces the crime rate by 0.083%. 
As expected, TOURISM positively affects criminal activity: a one per cent 
increase in arrivals leads to a 0.018% increase in total crime. It is worth noticing 
that results do not change when the model is re-estimated using different measures 
of tourism (arrivals or nights per population, per square meters, etc.)9. 
As discussed in Section 2, coefficients might underestimate the underlying 
relationship due to a measurement error in the dependent variable. As a 
consequence, the “real” impacts should be even higher that those reported here. 
However, given the results, if the long-run equilibrium is assumed, the elasticities 
may be obtained by dividing each of the estimated coefficients by , 
where  is the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. Following this 
reasoning, the long run impact of tourism on crime in Italy is about 0.11%.  
_________________________ 
9 We have tested the tourism-crime relationship using also the quadratic form of the tourism variable 
(TOURISM_SQ) and we have found confirmation that, in the model in which total crime and 
tourism arrivals are considered, this relationship is linear (Model 3). 
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In a time series analysis on the case of Miami, McPheters and Stronge (1974) find 
that the short run elasticity of crime with respect to tourism is 0.03%. Jud (1975) 
in a cross section analysis on 32 Mexican States reports 0.34%. In a recent cross-
section application on property related crime and tourism in Italy, Biagi and 
Detotto (2012) estimate the short run elasticity to be 0.22%. 
 
Table 5. GMM results 
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
VARIABLES 
Crime per  
100k inh. 
Crime per  
100k inh. 
Crime per  
100k inh. 
Crime Crime Crime Crime Crime 
         
Crimet–1 0.83*** 0.83*** 0.83*** 0.82*** 0.82*** 0.82*** 0.82*** 0.82*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) 
Growth 0.091 0.090 0.065 -0.036 -0.038 -0.022 -0.026 -0.034 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.064) (0.063) (0.051) (0.062) (0.063) 
Income 0.089*** 0.093*** 0.081*** 0.078*** 0.084*** 0.069*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) 
Unemployment 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.031*** 0.029** 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
Density 0.007 0.006 0.007      
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)      
Population    0.19*** 0.19*** 0.15 0.20*** 0.19*** 
    (0.024) (0.025) (0.091) (0.030) (0.024) 
Population_sq      0.001   
      (0.003)   
Tourism 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.023      
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.018)      
Tourism_sq   -0.0004      
   (0.002)      
EqTou    0.015*** 0.016*** 0.025 0.035 0.015*** 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.024) (0.032) (0.0037) 
EqTou_sq      -0.0005   
      (0.001)   
EqTou*Pop       -0.0015  
       (0.0024)  
Diploma -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.011 -0.011 -0.007 -0.008 -0.012 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Deterrence -0.083*** -0.083*** -0.087*** -0.085*** -0.086*** -0.094*** -0.088*** -0.086*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
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Table 5 continued 
South  0.0041   0.009    
  (0.015)   (0.014)    
Area    -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.026*** -0.027*** –0.082 
    (0.0066) (0.0068) (0.0065) (0.0064) (0.053) 
Area_sq        0.004 
        (0.004) 
Constant 0.34 0.31 0.43 -1.52*** -1.57*** -1.17* -1.64*** -1.31*** 
 (0.22) (0.24) (0.24) (0.35) (0.34) (0.67) (0.47) (0.40) 
         
Observations 1,710 1,710 1,710 1,710 1,710 1,710 1,710 1,710 
N. of provinces 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 
         
Arellano-Bond1 0.74 0.74 0.79 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.71 
Sargan test2 954.38 954.44 948.11 854.24 855.25 1020.36 970.82 855.28 
Hansen test2 62.64 64.30 73.62 63.98 64.39 71.40 65.02 67.89 
df;3 
χ(df) critical  

















Test on joint  
significance4 
36.33*** 34.51*** 35.93*** 40.75*** 38.62*** 38.90*** 40.23*** 40.96*** 
1Arellano-Bond (1991) statistic test under the null hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation in the residuals. 
2Sargan (1958) and Hansen (1982) statistic tests under the null hypothesis of the joint validity of the instruments. 
3Degrees of freedom. 4Test on joint significance of time dummies. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
3.3 Comparing the Impact of Tourists and Residents on Crime 
In a further step, we investigate whether the effect of tourists on crime is 
significantly different from that of residents. At this stage, the variables of interests 
are population, tourism nights and size of the province. In order to compare 
resident and tourist populations, the “equivalent tourist population” of each 
province is calculated considering the share of yearly number of nights spent by 
tourists in the official accommodations (ISTAT) over 365 days (Equation 6): 
 (6) 
for i = 1, …, 95 and t = 1985, …, 2003. 
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As anticipated above, EqTou measures the total number of tourists in a given 
province per day. This variable is substituting the tourist arrivals used in Models 1, 
2 and 3.  
The new specifications of equations 3 and 4 are the following: 
  (7) 
where:  
m= is equivalent tourists (night of stay in a year/365); 
n= is resident population 
d= area of the province in square kilometre 
g (.)= controls 
k,h,v= parameters  





 propensity to be victimized of resident population; 
 propensity to report of resident population; 
 propensity to be victimized of tourists; 
 propensity to report of tourist. 
 
We can compare the effect of resident and tourists on crime by means of the  
and  parameters. If  > , the elasticity of crime with respect to the number of 
residents is higher than that related to the number of tourists.  
The results are shown in Columns 4–8 of Table 5. The outcomes are quite 
stable and similar to the ones obtained before (see INCOME, UNEMPLOYMENT 
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and DETERRENCE in Models 1, 2, and 3). The coefficient of POPULATION and 
TOURISM have the expected sign and are strongly significant, therefore a one per 
cent increase in population and nights spent leads to a rise on total crime 
respectively by 0.19% and 0.015% in the short run, and by 1.06% and 0.083% in 
the long run. Such results indicate that crime is affected more by resident 
population than tourists. Unfortunately, we cannot estimate  and  of equations 
9 and 10 that represent the victimization and reporting rates of the two sub-groups, 
since no data or publications on those rates are available. Since  and  are 
unknown and  > , we can hypothesize the following three scenarios: 
1.  and ; both the propensity to be victimized and to report are 
higher for residents than for tourists. 
2.  and ; residents’ propensity to be victimized is much higher 
than tourists’, while the propensity to report is slightly lower.  
3.  and ; the propensity to be victimized of residents is slightly 
lower than that of tourists, while the propensity to report of residents is much 
higher.  
We would indicate scenario 2 as the least common since it seems unlikely that 
tourists have higher propensity to report than residents. On the contrary, the 
opportunity cost of tourists is expected to be higher than non-tourists given the 
relatively short time they spend in the destination. Scenarios 1 and 3 have different 
policy implications, in the former residents are the main target of criminal activity, 
while in the latter the opposite is true. Unfortunately, we cannot indicate which 
scenario fits the results of the present paper.  
In Columns 6 and 7 we test the robustness of  and , and specifically in 
Column 6 we add the variables in square form, POPULATION_SQ and 
TOURISM_SQ; both are not significant supporting the (log) linearity hypothesis. 
In Column 7, an interaction variable (EQTOU*POP) is included in order to check 
the extent of any agglomeration effect on crime, the coefficient is not significant; 
the same effect is indirectly checked using the area of the province (in square 
kilometres), the coefficient is significant and equal to –0.027. This means that a 
1% increase in the province area (holding constant the number of tourists and 
population) leads to a 0.027% reduction of crime. Even for the variable AREA the 
(log) linearity hypothesis is confirmed (Column 8). 
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This outcome gives a first suggestion on the possible source of the negative 
externality found when total crime is analysed: the impact of a rise in residents and 
tourists on crime is quite significant, which may indicate that the main forces 
driving tourism-crime relationship is the agglomeration effect. Therefore, when 
total crime is considered, irrespectively of the subtypes of crime offences, 
overcrowded cities give criminals more opportunities to commit illegal activities. 
Probably, as the previous studies suggest, the presence of tourists provides an 
incentive for certain illegal activities; therefore, the substitution among crime types 
should be further explored. 
4 Concluding Remarks 
The tourism-led growth hypothesis has been widely analysed by scholars, who 
overall agree on the significant role of the tourism sector in enhancing economic 
growth. While many studies focus on the short run relationship, a small number of 
them analyses the relationship between tourism and growth in the long run. There 
is also a wide concern about the negative impact of tourism activity in the host 
community in terms of social and environmental degradation. 
A possible source of negative externality exists when criminal activity 
develops in response to the presence of visitors. As Grinols et al. (2011) highlight, 
there are many reasonable theories stemming from economic and sociological 
studies of crime determinants that may explain the relationship between tourism 
and crime. The economic literature barely explores this issue and when it does, it 
produces controversial results.  
The main aim of the present paper is to test whether the positive tourism-crime 
relationship that Biagi and Detotto (2012) find for property-related crime in a 
cross-section of Italian provinces, is persistent over time and holds when total 
crime is analysed. In other words, this study analyses the dynamic relationship 
between tourist population and total crime. To do so, the OLS and System GMM 
approach are applied.  
We find that tourism positively affects criminal activity; in the short run, a 
one-per-cent increase in arrivals leads to a 0.018% rise in total crime, while, in the 
long run, the impact is about 0.11%.  
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We further compare the crime elasticity of residents and tourists, by re-
estimating the model using the level of total crime instead of the rate of crime 
(Models 4–8) and equivalent tourist population. We obtain that the impact of 
resident population is higher than the one of the tourists (i.e.  > ) and the 
difference between the coefficients associated with residents (h) and tourists (k) is 
significantly different from zero. The results do not allow identifying which factor 
(i.e. the propensity of residents and non-residents to be victimized and to report to 
police) plays the main role in  and .  
This represents the limitation of the analysis. Also, aggregate crime data such 
as total crime rate, could fail to signal the presence of differences among crime 
typologies. In fact, it is reasonable to argue that the impact of tourists is higher for 
some types of crime, such as pick pocketing, bag snatching and fraud, and less for 
other types of illegal activity, such as financial crimes, handling and extortion. 
Finally, it is possible that the coefficients might underestimate the underlying 
relationship due to measurement errors in the dependent variable. The crime data 
used in this paper are the total offences recorded by the Police, this probably 
represents just the tip of the iceberg of this phenomenon. As a further 
development, a state space approach (Hamilton, 1994) can be applied in order to 
estimate the unobservable component of crime series. In addition, other 
improvements may go in the direction of exploring how the tourism-crime 
relationship changes according to the types of tourists (national and foreign) and 
type of crime (against property or individuals). 
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